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Abstract:	 This	 article	 demonstrates	 that	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	
Economic	 Partnership	 Agreements	 (EPAs),	 the	 EU,	 as	 the	 more	
powerful	 actor,	 shifts	 between	 hegemony	 and	 dominance	 in	 its	
relations	 with	 the	 CARIFORUM	 (CF)	 states	 in	 particular,	 and	 the	
African	Caribbean	and	Pacific	(ACP)	states	in	general.	It	also	sheds	
light	 on	 the	 slow	 process	 of	 endogenous	 Caribbean	 regional	
integration,	 which,	 despite	 any	 best	 endeavours	 from	 the	 EU,	 is	
actually	complicated	by	the	EU’s	emphasis	on	the	EPA	as	a	tool	for	
integration.	 It	 shows	 that	 despite	 the	 conclusion	 and	 subsequent	
definition	of	the	EPA	as	the	case	par	excellence	of	the	success	of	the	
broader	EPA	policy,	it	is	not	a	Pareto-optimal	agreement.	Reference	
is	 made	 to	 the	 cases	 of	 the	 EU	 Common	 Agricultural	 Policy,	 the	
Protocol	on	Culture	and	the	recent	decision	by	EU	policy-makers	to	
extend	the	Octroi	de	Mer	until	2020,	the	same	date	as	the	Cotonou	
agreement	binding	EU-ACP	relations	is	due	to	expire.		
	
Keywords:	EU;	CARIFORUM;	CARICOM;	ACP;	Trade;	Regional	Integration;	Economic	Development;	Hegemony		The	 challenge	 that	 faces	 developing	 countries	 is	 not	merely	 the	 challenge	 of	 economic	 development,	 but	 the	fact	 that	 in	 failure	 lies	 the	danger	of	 returning	 to	a	new	dependency	 -	 a	new	kind	of	 colonialism	 -	deriving	 from	economic	weakness.2		 Sir	Shridath	Ramphal,	Glimpses	of	a	Global	Life,	2014.	
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INTRODUCTION:	EPAs	AS	POLEMIC	POLICY		The	case	of	the	Economic	Partnership	Agreement	(EPA)	between	CARIFORUM	 (CF)	 and	 the	 European	 Union	 (EU)	 offers	 lessons,	both	 in	 terms	of	negotiation	and	 implementation,	with	 regard	 to	the	 EPAs	 as	 a	 broader	 policy	 tool	 and	 strategy	 towards	 the	African,	Caribbean	and	Pacific	(ACP)	regions	as	a	whole.	Since	the	signing	of	the	CF-EU	EPA	on	15	October	2008,	four	years	after	the	start	 of	 negotiations,	 and	 at	 the	 current	 stage	of	 the	preliminary	five-year	 implementation	 review,3	 no	 other	 African	 or	 Pacific	region	has	signed	a	‘full’	EPA.	Indeed,	the	successful	agreement	of	a	 ‘full’	 EPA	 with	 Caribbean	 states,	 as	 compared	 to	 their	 African	and	 Pacific	 partners	 within	 the	 ACP	 grouping,	 has	 rendered	 the	CF-EU	EPA	by	default	the	example	par	excellence	of	the	success	of	this	new	foreign	policy.	Indeed,	part	of	the	rationale	 for	the	early	completion	 of	 the	 EU-Caribbean	 accord	 was	 to	 generate	 an	agreement	 that	 could	 be	 trumpeted	 from	 very	 early	 on,	 and	thereby	 help	 to	 generate	 momentum	 in	 the	 later	 negotiations	taking	place	in	Africa	and	the	Pacific.	Yet	claiming	success	on	the	basis	of	either	the	early	signing	or	the	 consequent	 provisional	 application	 of	 the	 CF-EU	 EPA	 in	particular,	or,	indeed,	its	utility	as	a	specific	foreign	policy	tool	in	general,	would	generate	a	misleading	cause-effect	relationship.	By	contrast,	 two	observations	can	be	made	at	 this	stage.	On	the	one	hand,	it	does	not	seem	likely	that	the	African	regions	or	the	Pacific	will	 ever	 agree	 to	 a	 ‘full’	 EPA.	 On	 the	 other,	 this	 has	 set	 a	precedent	that	a	 ‘full’	EPA	cannot	be	achieved	 in	the	near	 future,	in	 turn	 laying	 the	 path	 for	 the	 development	 of	 ‘interim’	 EPAs	(iEPA),	 or	 ‘à	 minima’	 EPAs,4	 which	 are	 less	 ambitious	 in	 scope.	This	 therefore	 inherently	 discredits	 any	 causal	 link	 that	may	 be	sought	between	successfully	negotiating	an	EPA	and	the	EPA	as	a	successful	 foreign	 policy	 towards	 the	 ACP	 regions.	 Recognising	this	EPA	history	highlights	 the	disparities	 in	 rhetoric	 and	 reality	that	gives	weight	to	the	increasingly	sharp	critique	that	the	EPAs	are,	 in	 essence,	 a	 deeply	 flawed	 policy	 tool.5	 It	 therefore	encourages	a	deeper	interrogation	of	the	specificity	of	the	EPA	as	an	evolution	in	the	EU-ACP	relationship	and	a	redefinition	of	trade	and	 development	 relations	 within	 and	 beyond	 the	 Cotonou	framework	due	to	expire	in	2020.	While	 it	 is	 perfunctory	 to	merely	 judge	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	agreement,	 negotiation	 ought	 to	 be	 contextualised	 in	 its	 organic	
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 state	 as	 interaction	 between	 negotiators	 from	 different	 camps,	each	 trying	 to	achieve	 the	Pareto-optimal	outcome.	But	evidence	shows	 that	perhaps	while	 the	CF-EU	EPA	 is	 the	only	 ‘full’	EPA,	 it	does	 not	 represent	 a	 Pareto-optimal	 outcome.	 Looking	 at	 the	economic,	political	and	legal	parts	of	the	agreement	highlights	the	disparity	 in	 opinion	 which	 has	 rendered	 this	 agreement	 in	particular,	 and	 EPAs	 in	 general,	 a	 hotly	 contested	 subject.	Furthermore,	 seven	 years	 into	 its	 provisional	 application,	 along	with	very	slow	progress	on	the	implementation	front,	brings	into	question	whether	the	negotiators	did,	indeed,	manage	to	conclude	a	 Pareto-optimal	 agreement.	 It	 also	 calls	 into	 question	 the	 EU’s	role	as	an	actor	vis-à-vis	the	Caribbean,	blurring	the	boundaries	at	times	between	hegemony	and	dominance.	The	 EPA	 was	 not	 conjured	 up	 in	 an	 economic	 or	 political	vacuum;	 it	 is	 built	 on	 the	 premise	 that	 the	 previous	 economic	relationship	had	 failed.	As	 former	EU	Trade	Commissioner	Karel	de	Gucht	puts	it:			 …as	 regards	 the	 economic	 fundamentals,	 the	 truth	 is	 that	 the	current	 system	 has	 failed;	 that	 ACP	 countries	 have	 become	increasingly	marginalised	 in	world	 trade,	even	with	 the	generous	tariff	preferences	since	the	Cotonou	and	Lomé	agreements.6			In	addition	to	this,	European	Commissioners	for	Development	and	Trade	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 EPA’s	 signing,	 Louis	 Michel	 and	 Peter	Mandelson,	argued	that:			 [t]he	 trade	 preferences	 of	 the	 Cotonou	 agreement,	 while	 well	intentioned,	 have	 not	 succeeded	 in	 their	 objective	 of	 helping	 to	integrate	the	ACP	countries	into	the	world	economy,	nor	protected	our	 trade	 relationship	with	 the	 ACP	 from	 challenge	 by	 others	 in	the	WTO.7		In	this	light,	DG	Trade	further	explains	that	 ‘[t]he	EPAs	set	out	to	help	ACP	countries	integrate	into	the	world	economy	and	share	in	the	opportunities	offered	by	globalisation’.8	 Yet	 the	 current	 state	of	play	in	the	implementation	and	aftermath	of	the	CF-EU	EPA	in	particular,	 and	 the	 tardy	 progress	 in	 the	 EPAs	 in	 general,	demonstrates	a	reluctance	on	the	part	of	many	actors	to	share	in	the	opportunities	of	 globalisation	 that	 this	model	embodies:	 that	is	 to	 say,	 integrating	 into	 the	 global	 capitalist	 economy	 by	adapting	to	and	adopting	the	ideals	of	neoliberal	economics.	
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 The	 EPA	 therefore	 builds	 on	 years	 of	 cooperation,	 both	formally	 from	 the	 Treaty	 of	 Rome,	 where	 reciprocal	 relations	were	the	norm,	through	to	the	non-reciprocal	relations	embodied	in	Lomé,	 and	has	now	come	back	 full	 circle	 to	 the	original,	post-colonial	basis	of	relations	in	reciprocity.9	Such	reciprocity	will	be	phased-in	as	trade	in	goods	is	liberalized	over	a	period	of	25	years	from	 signing:	 i.e.	 by	 2033	 the	 CF	 and	 EU	 should	 –	 in	 theory,	 at	least	 -	 enjoy	 reciprocal	 trade	 with	 each	 other.10	 Of	 course,	 the	broader	EU-ACP	relationship,	as	understood	today,	predates	these	formal	 institutionalised	 affairs	 and	 harks	 much	 further	 back	 in	history.	Recalling	 this	 history,	which	was	 fundamentally	 built	 on	highly	asymmetric	relations	of	power	and	colonialism	is	crucial	if	we	 are	 to	 fully	 understand	 the	 current	 economic	 and	 structural	imbalances	that	exist	between	the	EU	and	ACP	countries.		This	paper,	then,	sheds	light	on	the	CF-EU	EPA,	heralded	as	‘the	first	 genuinely	 comprehensive	 North-South	 trade	 and	development	agreement	in	the	global	economy’.11	By	looking	into	the	 political,	 economic	 and	 legal	 implications	 of	 the	 agreement,	from	 the	 vantage	 point	 of	 seven	 years	 post-conclusion,	 the	following	 sections	 make	 the	 case	 that	 the	 EPA	 is	 not	 Pareto-optimal.	 Additionally,	 it	 deploys	 the	 Neo-Gramscian	 notion	 of	power	 -	 as	 hegemony	 when	 based	 on	 consent,	 and	 dominance	when	 based	 on	 coercion	 –	 in	 order	 to	 analyse	 and	 elucidate	 the	historic	 balance	 of	 power,	 which	 today	 is	 defined	more	 through	consent	 and	 the	 formal	 processes	 of	 diplomacy,	 than	 was	previously	the	case	through	coercion.		
THE	NEO-GRAMSCIAN	CONCEPTION	OF	POWER		This	 investigation	 utilises	 a	Neo-Gramscian	 conception	 of	 power	to	 explain	 how	 the	 CF-EU	 EPA	 was	 able	 to	 facilitate	 a	 much	broader	pro-EPA	discourse.	 Such	a	view	of	power	 sheds	 light	on	how	the	inherent	disparity	in	power	relations	between	the	North	and	the	South	in	a	non-trivial	manner	is	normalised,	emphasising	how			 the	 economic	 life	 of	 subordinate	 nations	 is	 penetrated	 by	 and	intertwined	 with	 that	 of	 powerful	 nations.	 This	 is	 further	complicated	 by	 the	 existence	 within	 countries	 of	 structurally	diverse	regions	which	have	distinctive	patterns	of	relationship	to	external	forces.12			
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 The	 Caribbean	 economy,	 de	 tabula	 rasa,	 has	 always	 been	penetrated	by	and	intertwined	with	the	former	colonial	powers	of	Europe.	 Moreover,	 the	 export	 of	 key	 commodities	 during	 the	colonial	 era	 formed	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 very	 distinct	 pattern	 of	 trade,	which	 is	 today	 at	 the	 root	 of	 the	 distinctive	 nature	 of	contemporary	 relations.	 The	 issues	 range	 from	 the	 direct	 trade	implications	 arising	 from	 the	 soon-to-be	 350	 year-old	 Octroi	 de	
Mer	 (i.e.	 ‘dock	 duties’	 enjoyed	 by	 the	 French	 Overseas	Departments,	which	 are	 at	 once	 Caribbean	 territories	within	 the	EU),13	 to	 the	 indirect	 implications	 arising	 from	 the	 EU’s	 internal	Common	Agricultural	Policy.	Using	the	neo-Gramscian	concept	of	power,	it	is	therefore	clear	that,			 with	 respect	 to	 structural	 power,	 the	 direct	 and	 coercive	 face	 of	colonial	 power	 gave	 way	 to	 an	 indirect,	 and	 perhaps	 more	consensual	 face,	 in	 that	 market	 constraints,	 as	 well	 as	 a	 set	 of	aspirations	on	 the	part	of	 elite	 and	mass	 in	developing	 countries	come	 together	 to	both	motivate	 their	productive	 arrangement	 as	well	as	to	constrain	their	potential	for	economic,	as	well	as	cultural	development	 [...]	 With	 time,	 the	 coercive	 use	 of	 power	 may	become	 less	necessary	and	also	 less	obvious	as	 consensus	builds	up	on	 the	basis	 of	 shared	values,	 ideas	 and	material	 interests	on	the	part	of	both	ruling	and	subordinated	classes.14			The	EPA	may	therefore	be	conceptualised	as	a	continuation	of	this	process,	as	the	EU	has	clearly	moved	beyond	its	dominant	position	but	attempts	to	maintain	a	hegemonic	role	vis-à-vis	the	Caribbean	region.	The	EPA	reinforces	particular	patterns	of	EU-CARIFORUM	relations,	 and	 ensures	 continued	 market	 access	 for	 the	 EU,	 and	mitigates	against	any	potential	 loss	from	traditional	(e.g.	US)	and	emerging	 (e.g.	 Latin	 America)	 competitors.	 Therefore,	 the	 EU	maintains	 structural	 influence	 and	 power	 in	 the	 Caribbean,	 but	importantly,	agreements	are	based	on	consent.		The	 conclusion	 and	 subsequent	 implementation	 of	 the	 CF-EU	EPA,	according	to	one	European	trade	expert,	marks	a	coming	of	age	of	the	CF	region	and	qualifies	the	process	of	negotiation	of	the	EPA	 as	 one	 of	 equals.15	 However,	 this	 does	 not	 override	 the	interplay	 of	 hegemony	 and	 dominance	 throughout	 negotiation.	Rather,	 two	 factors	 disturb	 this	 assertion,	 which	 in	 isolation	reinforces	 unfounded	 notions	 that	 the	 CF	 is	 the	 example	 par	
excellence	of	the	success	of	the	EPAs,	and	reflective	of	positive	EU-ACP	 relations	 more	 broadly:	 firstly,	 the	 current	 slow	 pace	 of	Caribbean	 regional	 integration	 and	 secondly,	 the	uneven	pace	 of	
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 EPA	implementation.	 In	 terms	of	regional	 integration,	 the	advent	of	 the	 formal	 institution	 of	 the	 CARIFORUM	 with	 the	 EPA	 –	 as	CARICOM	plus	 the	Dominican	Republic	 (DR)	 -	shows	that	 the	EU	as	an	exogenous	actor	can	influence	the	endogenous	processes	of	integration	 in	 the	 Caribbean.16	 This	 can	 prove	 to	 be	 a	 positive	innovation	 for	 Caribbean	 regional	 integration,	 however	 at	 the	regional	 level,	 and	 despite	 the	 EPA,	 the	 Dominican	 Republic’s	integration	 into	 the	 formal	 structures	 of	 CARICOM	 are	consistently	 rejected	 by	 the	 wider	 membership.17	 These	institutional	dynamics	will	have	serious	 implications	 for	 the	EPA	and	 will	 impact	 not	 only	 the	 pace,	 but	 depth	 of	 liberalisation	across	all	CF	countries.		These	dynamics	are	further	complicated	by	the	political	status-quo,	plainly	summed-up	by	a	high-level	CARICOM	official:			 we've	stopped	planning,	the	only	objective	is	staying	in	power	[…]	there	is	a	preference	for	individual	member	states	even	though	a	common	approach	is	stronger	[…]	CARICOM	is	a	bad	word.18			Against	this	backdrop,	it	is	therefore	no	surprise	that	currently,			 [m]ost	 of	 the	 public	 sector	 seems	 locked	 into	 a	 model	 that	anticipates	continuing	grants	and	budgetary	support,	while	much	of	 the	 private	 sector	 has	 failed	 to	 look	 either	 at	 the	 region	 or	beyond	 as	 a	 market	 opportunity.	 All	 of	 which	 suggests	 that	 the	region	 is	 being	 outpaced	 by	 new	 thinking	 and	 seems	 unable	 or	unwilling	 to	 react,	 garner	 support	 or	mobilise	 public	 opinion	 in	the	time	scales	in	which	the	rest	of	the	world	is	operating.19			This	highlights	the	disparity	of	the	importance	of	the	EPA,	both	as	a	 tool	 and	 a	 long-term	 strategy,	 in	 both	 the	 Caribbean	 and	European	 circles.	 It	 also	 critically	 reinforces	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
volonté	 to	 integrate	 and	 implement	 must	 be	 endogenous.	Unfortunately,	this	does	not	bode	well	for	the	conceptualisation	of	the	 power	 the	 EU	 exerts	 vis-à-vis	 an	 internally	 fragmented	 CF,	which	may	be	conceptualised	as	dominant,	hegemonic,20	or	even	imperialistic21	 merely	 because	 of	 the	 internal	 governance	situation	of	the	Caribbean.	The	 following	 sections	 of	 the	 paper	 look	 into	 the	 political,	economic	 and	 legal	 aspects	 of	 the	 agreement.	 The	 last	 section	makes	reference	to	three	case	studies	to	further	emphasise	that	by	shifting	 between	 hegemony	 and	 dominance	 the	 EU	 achieved	 the	first	full	EPA	with	CF	countries,	but	this	by	no	means	is	equivalent	
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 to	achieving	a	Pareto-optimal	agreement.	This	is	explicit	today	in	several	 factors	 discussed	 in	 this	 paper	 -	 including	 the	 lack	 of	implementation	 in	 CF,	 along	with	 the	 continued	 critique	 of	 neo-	liberalisation	 as	 a	 tool	 for	 development	within	 both	 CF	 and	ACP	circles	–	which	remain	serious	obstacles	to	future	progress	in	EU-ACP	relations.		
ECONOMICS	PERVADING	POLITICS		A	political	analysis	 illustrates	clearly	 that	 the	neoliberal	 ideology	of	the	EU	shapes	its	long-term	relationship	with	the	ACP.	In	other	words,	economics	pervades	politics.	This	is	evident	in	the	rhetoric	on	the	supposed	partnership	of	equals,	 the	 influence	of	 financing	the	 ACP	 states	 in	 their	 negotiations	with	 the	 EU,	 along	with	 the	resulting	 break-up	 and	 re-branding	 of	 the	 Caribbean	 Regional	Negotiating	 Machinery	 (CRNM)	 that	 negotiated	 the	 CF-EU	 EPA.	There	are	a	number	of	dimensions	to	the	issue.	Firstly,	 the	 rhetoric	 regarding	 a	 partnership	 of	 equals	 cannot	hold	true	beyond	the	diplomatic	sense	of	the	term	due	to	extreme	economic	 differences	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 CF	 regions.	While	 the	rhetoric	 holds	 that	 ‘sovereign	 states	 are	 equal,	 the	 principle	 of	sovereignty	 is	 important	 in	 the	 international	sphere	and	vital	 for	integrity’,22	 the	 stark	 differences	 in	 economic	 power	 or	 share	 of	world	 trade	 undermine	 de	 facto	 equality.	 That	 is,	 even	with	 the	Dominican	 Republic’s	 economy,	 which	 is	 as	 big	 as	 all	 the	CARICOM	 states	 combined,	 the	 CF	 share	 of	 world	 trade	 is	 a	fraction	 of	 the	 EU	 equivalent.	 Consequently,	 although	 notional	equality	 had	been	 the	defining	 feature	 of	 EU-ACP	 relations	 since	its	 conception	 in	 Lomé,	 along	with	 the	 advent	 of	 non-reciprocal	terms	 of	 trade,	 this	 has	 been	more	 of	 a	 strategic	 reference	 than	reflecting	any	reality.		Moreover,	 it	 has	 been	 systematically	 used	 to	 reinforce	 and	elide	 the	 reality	 of	 an	 unequal	 partnership,	 and,	 importantly,	 to	progressively	re-entrench	the	political	foundations	of	the	EU-ACP	relationship.23	As	 one	 commentator	 puts	 it,	 ‘notwithstanding	 the	achievements	 of	 Lomé	 I,	 the	 EU-ACP	 relationship	 soon	 became	reflective	 of	 the	 power	 asymmetry	 between	 the	 two	 parties.’24	Rather,	 the	 continued	 structural	 influence	 the	 EU	 bears	 on	 the	Caribbean	 region	 is	 emblematic	 of	 its	 history	 in	 the	 region.	 Its	influence	 is	 accurately	 summed	 up	 as,	 ‘de	 nouveau,	 tabula	 rasa,	where	 history	 bears	 down	 as	 nowhere	 else’.25	 Therefore,	 the	formal	construction	of	the	ACP	grouping	is	thus	merely	reflective	
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 of	 the	EU's	 strategic	 response	of	 organising	 its	 relations	with	 its	ex-colonies.	 Or,	 put	 differently,	 it	 is	 a	 redefinition	 of	 relations,	from	 one	 between	 coloniser	 and	 the	 dominated,	 to	 what	 has	become	commonplace	in	rhetoric:	a	partnership	of	equals.	Secondly,	while	the	‘modern	practice	of	competition	constructs	actors	 as	 formerly	 equal’,26	 this	 is	 more	 difficult	 to	 uphold	 in	reality.	 Important	 quantitative	 and	 qualitative	 differences	between	the	regions	 inevitably	carry	 implications	 for	balances	of	power.27	For	example,	one	ACP	official	has	pointed	to	the	difficulty	of	 accepting	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 partnership	 of	 equals	 when	 there	 is	financial	 support	 for	 development	 from	 one	 to	 the	 other.	 This	intrinsically	 removes	 equality	 since	 the	 person	 providing	 has	influence:	 ‘he	who	pays	 the	piper	 calls	 the	 tune’.28	 This	 saying	 is	often	 repeated	 in	 ACP	 circles,	 and	 infers	 that	 financial	independence	is	a	necessary	precursor	to	a	veritable	‘partnership	of	 equals’.29	 It	 also	 raises	 questions	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 EU	financing	of	the	negotiators	of	the	Caribbean	Regional	Negotiating	Machinery	 (CRNM)	 in	 the	 CF-EU	 negotiations.	 Furthermore,	 it	suggests	 the	 centrality	 of	 being	 a	 strong	 partner	 to	 partnership	agreements.	This	is	echoed	in	the	particular	case	of	the	Caribbean	where	it	is	recognised	that	‘the	CARICOM	needs	to	come	together	for	 the	 CARICOM	 to	 go	 to	 the	 EU’.30	 As	 such,	 a	 strong	 regional	grouping,	standing	on	its	own	two	feet,	stands	a	better	chance	of	living	up	to	the	rhetoric	of	‘partnership	of	equals’.	Thirdly,	 the	CF-EU	EPA	may	be	 considered	 as	 Pareto-optimal	due	 to	what	 a	 European	 trade	 expert	 claims	 is	 the	 difference	 in	negotiating	 capacity	 that	 the	 CF	 exerted,	 as	 compared	 to	 the	difference	in	asymmetrical	power	and	size.31		Indeed,	this	point	of	view	is	shared	by	some	CRNM	negotiators,	but	others	beg	to	differ.	For	one	CRNM	negotiator,			 partnership	 of	 equals	 is	 multilayered;	 garnering	 respect	 is	important.	 […]	The	EU	has	a	purported	 superior	knowledge	but	we	were	well-prepared	by	something	that	failed	-	the	FTAA’.32			This	reflects	this	CRNM	negotiator’s	preference	for	the	concept	of	‘parity	of	equals’,	highlighting	the	‘relationship	as	partnership	but	not	 of	 equals’.33	 However,	 for	 another	 CRNM	 negotiator,	 ‘the	decision	of	negotiation	was	a	European	decision	[…	as]	imposition	rather	 than	 negotiation’,34	 as	 such	 reaffirming	 the	 perceived	domineering	 or	 ‘big-stick’	 tactic	 of	 the	 European	 Commission.35	This	 illustrates	the	irony	of	critique	within	Caribbean	circles	that	overwhelmingly	 underscores	 the	 paradoxically	 exogenous	
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 perception	of	 change.	Additionally,	 the	 controversy	of	 the	CRNM	has	 certainly	 marked	 CARICOM:	 pursuant	 to	 the	 signing	 of	 the	EPA	 CARICOM	 changed	 its	 position	 on	 third	 party	 funding	 of	international	 trade	 negotiations;	 the	 CRNM	 was	 consequentially	re-branded	the	Office	of	Trade	Negotiations	(OTN)	and	thereafter	subsumed	within	the	CARICOM	Secretariat	in	2009.	This	is	largely	perceived	as	evidence	 -	 in	 the	Caribbean,	 that	 is	 -	 that	 the	CRNM	acted	 semi-autonomously.36	 Indeed,	 it	has	been	well	 summed	up	that,		 some	 seem	 to	 feel	 that	 the	 CRNM	 exceeded	 its	 mandate	 and	thereby	 killed	 itself,	 others	 seem	 to	 be	 of	 the	 view	 that	 the	negotiators	did	a	good	 thing	but	 in	a	bad	way	and	as	such,	 they	were	 a	 force	 for	 forced	 integration	 as	 opposed	 to	 a	 motor	 for	integration.37			This	 critique	 surrounding	 the	 EPA	 is	 intrinsically	 linked	 to	 the	perception	 of	 the	 role	 the	 EU	 plays	 vis-à-vis	 third	 countries,	namely	 that	 ‘great	 powers	 have	 relative	 freedom	 to	 determine	their	foreign	policies	[…];	smaller	powers	have	less	autonomy’.38		This	 is	 somewhat	 closer	 to	 the	 crude	 reality:	 negotiation	 is	about	 creating	 a	 win-win	 outcome.	 Yet,	 the	 controversy	 that	surrounds	the	CF-EU	negotiations,	with	the	retrospective	view	on	slow	 implementation	of	 the	agreement,	 is	 rather	reflective	of	 the	EU	demonstrating	hegemonic	power	to	co-opt	the	elite	of	the	CF.39	Indeed,	interviews	have	shown	that	synergies	and	dynamics	from	personal	 interaction	 were	 a	 driving	 force	 behind	 completing	 a	long	 process	 of	 negotiation.40	 This	 brought	 a	 deeper	 cognitive	appreciation	 of	 the	 contentious	 issues	 as	 hand,	 which	 in	 turn,	allowed	 for	 adequate	 compromise	 to	 conclude	 the	CF-EU	EPA.	 It	did	 not	 however,	 provide	 for	 deeper	 cognitive	 understanding	between	 the	 CF	 region	 itself,	 and	 is	 emblematic	 in	 the	 current	state	of	play	of	the	EPA	today.	A	European	Commission	official	admitted	that	the	partnership	is	‘not	a	partnership	of	equals	but	still	bona	fide’.41	In	other	words,	it	has	been	well	summed	up	as	follows:		 If	 this	 relationship	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 partnership,	 it	 is	 a	heavily	 unequal	 one.	 It	 is	 not	 the	 ACP	 countries	 that	 create	 or	discontinue	 their	 relationship	with	 the	EU,	nor	 that	provide	 the	terms	of	evolution	of	this	relationship.42		
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 These	terms	of	evolution,	of	which	the	EPA	is	the	central	strategic	tool,	 forms	part	 of	 the	 broader	 ‘Global	 Europe’	 vision	 emanating	from	Brussels,43	which,	 together	with	 the	 Treaty	 of	 Lisbon,	 goes	beyond	any	political	affinity	with	the	ACP	states.		
ECONOMIC	SECTOR	ANALYSIS		The	 fact	 that	 the	 CF-EU	 EPA	 was	 completed	 so	 quickly	 –	 when	compared	to	the	other	agreements	with	the	wider	ACP	–	 is	often	deemed	to	be	reflective	of	the	particular	economic	situation	of	the	Caribbean	 region	 in	 general,	 and	 its	 relative	 homogeneity	 and	level	 of	 development	 in	 particular.44	 Yet,	 despite	 the	 supposed	advances	 of	 CARICOM/CARIFORUM	 in	 comparison	 to	 other	 ACP	regions,	 both	 the	 CRNM	 and	 the	 Commission	 reaffirm	 that	 the	‘more	 developed	 country’	 (MDC)	 status	 does	 not	 overcome	structural	problems	in	the	region.	Indeed,	Hurt	highlights	how	this	categorisation	 merely	 divides	 the	 ACP	 states	 in	 LDC	 and	 other	developing	 countries,	 and	 it	 does	 not	 overcome	 key	 capacity	issues.45	 The	 EPA	 additionally	 entrenches	 a	 divide	 amongst	 the	ACP	 regions,	 by	 splitting	 the	 group	 into	 seven	 distinct	 regions,	often	with	quite	marked	heterogeneous	characteristics.	As	Lodge	explains:		 [i]	A	number	of	analyses	highlight	the	structural	challenges	facing	small	economies	that	mute	the	impact	of	trade	liberalisation.	(…)	[ii]	However,	 their	 intrinsic	economic	openness	also	means	 that	properly	 crafted	 trade	 policy	 can	 have	 a	 beneficial	 impact	 on	their	 development.	 [iii]	 In	 order	 to	 harness	 such	 opportunities,	modulated	 tariff	 liberalisation	 should	 be	 accompanied	 by	 EU-funded	development	support	to	reap	the	desired	results.46			This	 raises	 three	 pertinent	 and	 inter-related	 points,	 which	 are	addressed	in	turn.	Firstly,	whilst	structural	challenges	can	hinder	the	process	of	trade	liberalisation,	 it	 is	not	clear	that	more	of	the	latter	can	overcome	the	former.	Expanding	the	free	trade	agenda	can,	however,	 innovate	beyond	the	existing	regulatory	structures	and	 ‘renovate’	 the	 existing	 framework	 in	 place.	 Yet	 the	assumption	 that	 further	 liberalisation	 can	 act	 as	 a	 corrective	remedy	to	existing	constraints	is	predicated	on	a	broader	general	assumption	 that	 neoliberal	 economics	 can	 be	 of	 benefit	 to	what	are	quite	distinctive	Caribbean	economies,	particularly	concerning	the	 ‘WTO+’	 and	 ‘WTO-X’	 provisions.47	 However,	 there	 is	 a	consistent	 critique	 emanating	 from	ACP	 circles	 in	 regards	 to	 the	
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 nature	of	investment	liberalisation	provisions	in	trade	agreements	such	as	these.	This	is	emphasised	in	a	radical	point	on	investment	that	 was	 noted	 over	 forty	 years	 ago:	 ‘we	 have	 been	 posing	 the	wrong	questions	 regarding	 economic	backwardness	 […]	For	 it	 is	clear,	 foreign	 investment	 is	 the	 cause,	 and	 not	 a	 solution,	 to	 our	economic	backwardness’.48	More	recently,	an	ACP	official	echoed	this	statement	by	confirming	that	it	is	still	true	today:	‘FDI	is	about	“them”	 doing	 more	 business,	 more	 than	 “you”	 doing	 more	business;	similarly	having	the	capacity	and	legal	framework	is	also	for	 “them”’.49	 This	 type	 of	 argument	 is	 still	 prevalent	 nowadays	and	underscores	an	unfortunate	continuum	in	critique	of	the	ACP-EU	relationship.	Walter	Rodney	asked	this	question	in	1972,	but	it	may	be	necessary	to	pose	it	again	today:			 by	 distorting	 our	 economies	 to	 fit	 in	 with	 the	 demands	 of	 the	world	market,	 the	demands	of	which	are	not	always	compatible	with	 the	 demands	 of	 our	 own	 development,	 are	 we	 not,	 in	 the	process,	 depriving	 our	 economies	 of	 the	 capacity	 for	 a	 self-sustaining	growth	which	is	a	precondition	for	development?50			Secondly,	this	calls	into	question	whether	the	EPA	as	a	policy	tool	is	 the	 right	 means	 for	 this	 end:	 achieving	 the	 dual	 objective	 of	improving	 trade	 and	 development.	 An	 EEAS	 official	 highlighted	two	crucial	points	 that	 serve	 to	render	 this	analysis	all	 the	more	meaningful.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 EU	 has	 ‘new	 ambitions	 and	diminishing	 funds’,51	 that	 is,	 new	 ambitions	 vis-à-vis	 emerging	countries,	 but	 it	 also	 has	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 structural	 shocks	induced	by	the	financial	crisis.	Indeed,	the	effects	of	the	economic	and	financial	crisis	should	not	be	underestimated	for	both	regions	and	 could	 be	 a	 critical	 factor	 in	 the	 rate	 and	 enthusiasm	 of	implementation	 of	 the	 agreement.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 EPA	guarantees	 a	 share	 of	 the	 EU	 market	 and	 provides	 a	 long-term	economic	 strategy,	 as,	 after	 all,	 there	 is	 today	 a	 limited	menu	 of	alternatives,	 including	 the	 Generalised	 System	 of	 Preferences	(GSP)	 and	 GSP+	 (but	 in	 either	 case	 the	 EU	 has	 the	monopoly	 of	decision-making	 in	 these	 schemes).52	 Nonetheless,	 the	 transition	to	 provisionally	 applying	 the	 EPA	 and	 progressively	 liberalising	trade,	along	with	decreasing	funds	occasioned	by	the	principle	of	differentiation	 embodied	 in	 the	 so-called	 ‘Agenda	 for	 Change’,53	brings	 into	 question	 the	nature	 of	 the	EPA	 as	 a	 properly	 crafted	trade	policy.	 Indeed,	 it	may	not	be	too	 far-fetched	to	ask	to	what	extent	 the	 Caribbean	 is	 actually	 effectively	 now	 a	 laboratory	 in	which	 this	 new	 type	 of	 trade	 agreement	 is	 being	 tested.	 A	 DG	
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 Trade	 official	 has	 described	 this	 as	 evidence	 of	 ‘poor	 timing’	 on	the	 part	 of	 the	 EU	 and	 adds	 that	 ‘MDCs	 have	 every	 right	 to	 be	annoyed’.54	 This	 adds	 to	 the	 existing	 mistrust	 towards	 the	 EU	 -	especially	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 selective	 use	 of	 protectionism	 -	 which	seems	 inconsistent,	 to	 say	 the	 least,	 with	 its	 contemporary	promotion	 of	 deep	 and	 comprehensive	 trade	 liberalisation.	Echoing	 Rodney’s	 development-underdevelopment	 dialectic,	George	explains	that		 Britain	 protected	 its	 industry	 and	 commerce	 from	 foreign	competition	 until	 it	 was	 well	 on	 the	 way	 to	 achieving	 global	dominance.	 […]	 In	 consequence	 Britain's	 ownership	 of	 foreign	assets	 expanded	 a	 hundred-thousand-fold	 between	 1580	 and	1930.	Britain	developed.	The	countries	it	invested	in	did	not.55		While	 this	 quotation	 refers	 to	 the	 UK,	 the	 EU’s	 own	 modern	development	is	not	dissimilar.	Put	simply:	the	developed	states	of	the	EU	are	‘kicking	away	the	ladder’	that	they	themselves	climbed	in	order	to	develop	their	own	economies.56	Thirdly,	question	marks	still	hang	over	the	extent	to	which	the	opportunities	 represented	by	 the	EPAs	may	be	harnessed	 in	any	case.57	The	Caribbean	 region	 -	 except	 for	Haiti,	 as	 the	only	 least-developed	country	(LDC)	in	the	region	-	will	no	longer	be	eligible	to	 receive	 development	 cooperation	 funding	 due	 to	 the	aforementioned	 principle	 of	 differentiation,58	 which	 deliberately	targets	 development	 funding	 to	 LDCs	 and,	 in	 turn,	 encourages	other	 policies	 to	 spur	 development.	Hence,	 in	 theory,	 the	 EPA	 is	fundamentally	 a	 policy	 tool	 designed	 to	 replace	 traditional	development	 cooperation	 in	 the	 region.	 The	 following	 question	may	therefore	be	posed:	was	the	comprehensive	 ‘full’	EPA	tailor-made	 for	 the	 Caribbean?	 If	 yes,	 and	 logically	 so,	 the	 Caribbean	region	 had	 little	 to	 no	 choice	 in	 changing	 the	 nature	 of	 its	development	 relationships	 by	 adopting	 the	 EPA.	 After	 all,	 unlike	the	 African	 states,	 the	 Caribbean	 was	 not	 eligible	 for	 the	 EU’s	Everything	But	Arms	(EBA)	duty-free	quota-free	import	initiative.	But	 as	 the	 case	of	 the	East	African	Community	 (EAC)	 shows,	 the	EPA	 can	 be	 a	 hegemonic	 tool	 to	 create	 deeper	 liberalization	through	 the	 application	 of	 the	 exogenous	 power	 of	 the	 EU.59	Critics	 contest	 that	 there	 is	 no	EPA	 implementation	 fund	 for	 the	Caribbean,	 despite	 additional	 obligatory	 spending	 on	 EPA	implementation.60	Indeed,	implementation	is	a	key	indicator	of	the	success	 of	 the	 EPA	 and	 will	 surely	 illustrate	 whether	 the	 dual	
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 goals	of	improving	trade	and	development	can	be	achieved	within	these	new	structures.		On	this	note,	Sir	Ronald	Sanders	reminds	us		 that	the	fortunes	of	Europe's	riches	were	made	on	the	plantations	and	other	resources	of	 the	Caribbean	states.	Those	states	owe	a	duty	 of	 development	 to	 the	 Caribbean	 that	 was	 not	 fulfilled	 by	preferential	 access	 to	 their	 markets	 for	 the	 narrow	 range	 of	products	 such	as	 sugar	and	bananas	upon	which	 they	made	 the	Caribbean	dependent.61			The	 failed	 economic	 history	 recognised	 by	 high-level	 EU-ACP	officials,	 coupled	 with	 WTO	 imperatives,	 has	 provided	 ample	impetus	 for	 changing	EU-ACP	relations.	Yet	 there	has	been	 -	and	continues	 to	be	 -	much	 internal	 infighting	about	how	this	should	be	 done.62	 As	 the	 years	 of	 asymmetric	 liberalisation	 are	 being	counted	 down,	 the	 CF,	 as	 the	 weaker	 economic	 partner	 to	 the	agreement,	 should	 aim	 to	 harness	 the	 benefits	 of	 the	 agreement	sooner	 rather	 than	 later.	After	all,	 it	 is	 the	group	of	CARIFORUM	states	 who	 would	 lose	 out	 in	 the	 long	 run,	 and	 not	 the	considerably	more	powerful	EU,	which	is	already	driving	ahead	a	number	 of	 strategic	 trade	 agreements	 with	 other	 parts	 of	 the	world.		
LEGAL	SECTOR	ANALYSIS		The	CF-EU	EPA	is	reflective	of	 the	EU	as	a	 foreign	policy	actor	 in	the	 international	 scene,	 adhering	 to	 -	whilst	 contemporaneously	bypassing	-	WTO	law.	This	is	evidenced	in	the	‘WTO+’	and	‘WTO-X’	elements	of	the	agreement,63	which	in	turn	are	indicative	of	the	sheer	ambition	of	the	EPA	as	a	foreign	policy	tool	and	the	EU	as	a	foreign	policy	actor.	While	 the	existing	EU-ACP	 legal	relationship	is	 defined	 by	 the	 internationally	 legally	 binding	 commitment	 of	the	 Cotonou	 Agreement	 that	 is	 due	 to	 expire	 in	 2020,	 the	 EPA	strategically	 overcomes	 the	 tension	 borne	 in	 this	 agreement.	Specifically,	it	builds	on	the	special	exemption	of	the	WTO’s	Most-Favoured	Nation	 (MFN)	principle,	 by	 adhering	 to	Article	XXIV	of	the	General	Agreement	on	Tariffs	and	Trade	(GATT).	Article	XXIV	provides	 for	 derogation	 from	 the	 MFN	 principle	 for	 integration	purposes	insofar	as	relations	are	based	on	either	a	customs	union	or	a	free	trade	area	(FTA).64	The	EPA	therefore	departs	from	previous	relations,	as	not	only	does	 it	 include	 liberalisation	 of	 ‘substantially	 all	 trade	 in	 goods’	
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 (Art.	 XXIV	 GATT)	 but	 even	 goes	 beyond	 WTO	 law	 to	 include	reciprocal	trade	agreements	on	the	contested	‘Singapore	issues’.65	This	clearly	marks	a	substantive	shift	in	the	depth	and	width	of	its	scope	as	it	innovates	beyond	existing	agreements	and	sets	the	bar	as	 the	 most	 advanced	 international	 trade	 agreement	 between	developed	 and	 developing	 groups	 of	 states.	 It	 also	 importantly	created	 a	 ‘spiral	 of	 precedents’	 for	 the	 ACP	 group	 in	 particular,	and	future	world	trade	agreements	in	general.66	Ex-CRNM	 negotiator,	 Junior	 Lodge,	 has	 succinctly	 described	the	Cotonou	Agreement	 as	 sui	 generis,67	 underscoring	 the	 ‘broad	nature’	 of	 the	 agreement	 that	 the	 European	 Commission	 refers	to.68	While	 it	 is	 true	 that	 ‘all	EPAs	have	 their	origins	 in	 the	 trade	chapter	of	the	Cotonou	Agreement’,	 it	was	also	important	that	all	ACP	EPA	negotiators	 strongly	 took	 into	 consideration	 the	 end	of	the	 Cotonou	 Agreement	 in	 2020.69	 Yet,	 to	 date,	 there	 has	 been	little	 concrete	 debate	 on	 the	 post-Cotonou	 framework,	 or	 the	future	 of	 EU-ACP	 relations	 as	 a	 holistic	 group	 beyond	 2020.	Nonetheless,	between	the	two	deadlines	of	the	end	of	the	Cotonou	waiver	 and	 the	 EPAs	written	 into	 the	 Cotonou	 agreement,	 there	was	ample	legal	rationale	for	negotiating	the	EPAs.	This	raises	two	interlinked	points:	the	legal	commitment	of	Cotonou	has	received	much	 critique	 for	 binding	 the	 ACP	 countries	 into	 an	 agreement	that	 does	 not	 bring	 about	 the	 purported	 development	 benefits,	and	the	future	of	EU-ACP	relations	remains	in	a	grey	zone	beyond	2020.		Whilst	 DG	 Trade	 recognises	 that	 the	 EPAs	 are	 rooted	 in	 the	Cotonou	Agreement,	many	officials	 contend	 that	WTO	 law	 is	 the	status	quo	and	de	facto	reasoning	behind	the	change	in	the	nature	of	 the	 partnership.	 Indeed,	 contentious	 issues	 lie	 at	 the	 heart	 of	the	 depth	 of	 influence	 induced	 by	 adhering	 to	 Article	 XXIV	 of	GATT	and	the	MFN	principle.	For	critics	of	the	EU's	approach,	the	‘WTO	argument	does	not	sell’	due	to	the	‘incoherences	of	Art.	XXIV	as	 an	 article	 that	 was	 designed	 for	 developed	 groups	 and	 not	developed-developing	 groups’.70	 It	 is	 rather	 the	 case,	 as	 Tony	Heron	has	argued,	that:			 Although	the	imperative	of	“WTO	compatibility”	was	advanced	as	the	 principle	 justification	 for	 the	 trade	 dimension	 of	 Cotonou,	most	observers	argue	that	this	is	a	far	less	important	motivation	than	 the	 independent,	 political	 and	 commercial	 interests	 of	 the	EU.71		
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 This	echoes	the	point	that	often	arises	as	a	third	party	critique	of	EU	directionality:	the	EU	uses	a	two-pronged	approach	to	achieve	what	 it	wants,	 or	 in	 the	words	of	Bhagwati,	when	 it	 cannot	 take	the	multilateral	highway,	it	opts	for	the	bilateral	country	road.72	This	 is	 certainly	 the	 case	 with	 the	 conceptual	 disparity	between	Article	XXIV	GATT	and	its	relation	to	the	Enabling	Clause,	as	each	side	of	the	EPA	debate	uses	it	 for	 its	own	purposes.73	Yet	since	 the	 EU	 exercises	 greater	 structural	 influence	 in	 this	relationship,	this	may	be	an	increasingly	prevalent	example	of	the	EU	 adhering	 to,	 whilst	 contemporaneously	 bypassing,	 the	WTO:	i.e.	 exercising	 the	 power	 to	 influence	 and	 shape	 structures	 to	foster	commercial	regulatory	convergence	insofar	as	is	possible.		Whilst	the	CF-EU	EPA	was	signed	on	the	premise	that	it	would	bring	about	 structural	 advances	 through	dynamising	 the	process	of	 regional	 integration,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 highlight	 two	 points.	Firstly,	 ACP	 officials	 remain	 highly	 critical	 of	 the	 EU's	 insistence	on	the	legal	framework	and	highlight	the	disparity	in	EU	and	third	country	priorities.	It	is	often	repeated	that	the	EU	‘should	remind	them,	 but	 not	 push’.74	 This	may	 be	 exemplified	 in	 the	 continued	structural	and	normative	tensions	that	have	previously	hampered	the	 development	 of	 positive	 CARICOM-DR	 relations.	 Therefore,	even	if	the	EPA	cements	and	entrenches	the	existing	FTA	between	CARICOM	 and	 the	 DR,	 this	 is	 not	 the	 equivalent	 of	 fully	transcending	 those	 difficult	 issues	 that	 already	 exist.	 Lodge	explains	 that	 it	 ‘has	 effectively	 overhauled	 the	 CARICOM-Dominican	Republic	FTA	and	replaced	it	with	a	more	dynamic	and	ambitious	arrangement’.75	At	this	stage,	it	certainly	has	been	more	ambitious,	but	it	is	yet	to	prove	itself	more	dynamic.		Additionally,	 the	 legal	 framework	 in	 place	 has	 received	much	criticism	from	regional	partners	and	fellow	developing	countries.	The	negative	implications	for	further	South-South	FTAs	have	been	a	 particular	 point	 of	 contention	 raised	 by	 Latin	 American	countries,	 supported	 by	 China,	 India	 and	 South	 Africa.76	 These	implications	 ought	 to	 be	 clarified.	 As	 it	 stands,	 the	 MFN	 clause	contained	within	 the	 CARIFORUM	EPA	 goes	well	 beyond	 that	 of	Cotonou,	thereby	granting	the	EU	superior	preferential	treatment	than	 the	 wider	 developed	 world:	 ‘the	 C-EPA	 MFN	 provision	extends	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 MFN	 coverage	 to	 include	 advanced	developing	 countries	 that	 fall	 within	 the	 1	 per	 cent	 and	 1.5	 per	cent	 thresholds	 for	 countries	 and	 regions,	 respectively’.77	 To	compound	this,	the	MFN	clause	at	the	heart	of	the	EPA	specifically	requires	 CARIFORUM	 countries	 to	 consult	 with	 the	 EU	 if	 they	
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 consider	 entering	 into	 a	 free	 trade	 agreement	 with	 other	major	trading	economies.78		The	practical	implications	are	largely	perceived	as	a	hindrance	to	 future	 regional	 trade	 agreements	 on	 an	 international	 scale,	since	 these	provisions	are	evidently	not	reciprocal.	Furthermore,	some	 scholars	 even	 recognise	 this	 as	 evidence	 of	 asymmetrical	bargaining,79	 which	 in	 turn	 undermines	 the	 process	 of	 regional	integration.80	 This	 underlines	 the	 continuum	 in	 the	 dominant	behaviour	 of	 the	 EU	 vis-à-vis	 the	 Caribbean,	 despite	 any	 best	endeavours.		Moreover,	 especially	 given	 that	 the	 EU	 continues	 to	 pursue	other	regional	FTAs	or	Mega-regional	FTAs	(MRTAs),	such	as	the	Transatlantic	Trade	 and	 Investment	Partnership	 (TTIP)	with	 the	USA,81	 but	 also	 a	 number	 of	 other	 agreements,	 as	 well	 as	 the	plurilateral	 Trade	 in	 Services	Agreement	 (TiSA)	 at	 the	WTO,	 the	CF	 countries	 should	know	where	 they	 stand.82	 In	 that	 event	 that	the	 EPA	 is	 a	 precursor	 for	 further	 multilateralisation,	 the	consequent	 trade	 obligations	 borne	 by	 the	 CF	 states	would	 blur	the	 distinction	 between	 dominance	 and	 hegemony.	 Nonetheless,	the	 CF-EU	 EPA	 sets	 a	 precedent	 for	 trade	 relations	 despite	differences	in	development.83		This	 is	 linked	 to	 the	 second	 point:	 The	 fundamentally	 slow	process	of	regional	integration	in	the	Caribbean,	evidenced	by	the	slow	 advance	 of	 the	 Caribbean	 Court	 of	 Justice	 (CCJ)84	 and	 the	Caribbean	Single	Market	Economy	(CSME)	should	be	lessons	from	which	 the	 region	must	 learn	and	upon	which	 it	must	act.	Yet,	by	entering	 into	 legally	 binding	 agreements	 and	 replicating	models	without	 veritable	 implementation	 force,	 the	 EPA	 repeats	 history	in	 the	 Caribbean,	 and	 equally	 risks	 replicating	 the	 same	implementation	deficit,	even	if	it	is	enshrined	in	law.	To	this	date,	it	is	worth	noting	that	the	CF-EU	EPA	has	not	been	ratified	 by	 all	 signatory	 states	 of	 the	 EU	 and	 CARIFORUM.	Nonetheless,	 the	 CF-EU	 EPA	 is	 provisionally	 applied	 by	 both	regions,	although	to	little	effect.	Van	Genderen-Naar	explains	that	the	 ‘national	 laws	and	constitutions	of	CARIFORUM	States	[…]	do	not	 provide	 for	 provisional	 application	 of	 international	agreements,	which	means	that	they	can	not	provisional	apply	the	CF-EU	 EPA	 as	 long	 as	 the	 ratification	 procedures	 have	 not	 been	completed’.85	The	fact	that	not	all	signatory	countries	have	ratified	the	 EPA,	 even	 after	 seven	 years	 into	 the	 process	 of	 provisional	application,	 renders	 the	 signing	 of	 the	 EPA	 a	 superfluous	 -	 even	hollow	-	act	if	it	is	not,	at	the	very	least,	confirmed	in	law.86	
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The	Case	of	the	CAP	
	The	case	of	the	Common	Agricultural	Policy	(CAP)	exemplifies	the	critique	of	 the	 legal	commitment	of	Cotonou.	A	CRNM	negotiator	explained	the	problem	as	follows:			 Cotonou	was	 inherently	 contradictory:	 duty-free	 and	quota-free	market	 access	 to	 spur	export	diversification	has	been	muted	by	preferential	agricultural	arrangements,	for	instance,	the	Common	Agricultural	Policy:	prices	above	world	market	prices	[…]	and	in	any	case,	it	did	not	provide	for	services.87			This	 critique	 addresses	 the	 crux	 of	 the	 incoherent	 impact	 of	internal	 and	external	policies	and	underlines	 that	neither	 can	be	assessed	 in	 isolation.	 Rather,	 it	 has	 been	 clear	 that	 the	 internal	policy	of	CAP	has	negatively	 impacted	EU	external	relations	with	the	ACP,	by	having	a	distortionary	effect	on	world	markets.	It	has	been	well	 summed	 up	 that	 ‘it	 has	 become	 commonplace	 for	 the	removal	 of	 CAP	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 panacea	 for	 the	 whole	 of	 the	developing	world’.88		While	there	has	been	concern	that	the	market	openness	of	the	EPAs	does	not	sit	comfortably	with	the	inherent	protectionism	of	the	 CAP,89	 a	 recent	 publication	 by	 DG	 Agriculture	 and	 Rural	Development	 states	 that	 the	 CAP	 and	 development	 policy	 are	compatible.90	 In	 light	of	 the	 analysis	of	 the	 export	 restrictions	 in	the	CF-EU	EPA,	and	the	negative	implications	this	can	have	as	an	excessively	restrictive	policy	for	the	CF,91	this	document	seems	to	underline	policy	 coherence	 for	development	 (PCD)	with	 rhetoric	rather	 than	 reality.	 The	 EU	 is	 already	 the	 world’s	 top	 food	exporter,	 and	 has	 been	 so	 for	 key	 commodities,	 including	 sugar,	since	 the	 1980s.92	 Furthermore,	 there	 are	 veritable	 concerns	about	 the	 dismantling	 of	 the	 CAP	 regime	 and	 implications	 for	developing	country	farmers.	For	example,	the	removal	of	the	CAP	on	 beet	 sugar	 production	 in	 the	 EU	 risks	 jeopardising	 several	developing	 country	 economies,	 already	 suffering	 from	 low	 sugar	prices	 and	 increased	 competition.93	 The	 document	 rather	 seems	to	address	what	Silles-Brügge	refers	to	as	the	remaining	 ‘pockets	of	 protectionism’	 that	 emanated	 from	 the	 Global	 Europe	strategy.94	In	other	words,	the	internal	policies	of	the	EU,	such	as	the	 CAP,	 can	 have	 a	 huge	 impact	 externally.	 To	 some	 extent	 the	EPA	is	an	attempt	to	rectify	this.	Yet	unless	there	is	coherence	in	future	EU	policies	in	general,	history	risks	repeating	itself.	
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The	Case	of	the	Protocol	on	Culture		The	 CF-EU	 EPA	 legal	 text	 also	 includes	 the	 Protocol	 on	 Culture,	making	 it	 the	 first	 EU	 trade	 agreement	 to	 include	 this	 domain.	Research	showed	that	although	this	was	a	‘sensitive’	issue	for	the	EU,	it	was	included	at	the	request	of	Caribbean	negotiators,95	and	is	 therefore	 the	 result	 of	 a	 trade-off	 of	 interests.96	 The	 Cultural	Protocol	is	premised	on	the	UNESCO	Convention	on	the	Protection	and	 Promotion	 of	 the	 Diversity	 of	 Cultural	 Expressions:	 ‘to	support	the	development	of	the	cultural	industries	and	policies	in	developing	 countries	 through	 technology	 transfer,	 financial	support	 and	 preferential	 treatment’.97	 Therefore,	 it	 can	 serve	 to	facilitate	the	growth	and	export	of	cultural	industries,98	including	the	 audio-visual	 sector,	 as	 well	 as	 help	 to	 develop	 dynamic	creative	industries	and	creative	cities.99		However,	 it	 has	 already	 been	 noted	 that	 ‘the	 growth	 of	 the	industry	is	largely	determined	mainly	by	market	opportunity	and	government	 policy,	 and	 the	 effects	 of	 liberalisation	 are	 fairly	small’.100	This	highlights	the	fact	that	the	Caribbean	must	make	the	most	 of	 this	 type	 of	 agreement	 in	 order	 to	 draw	 any	 benefits.	Admittedly,	 this	 infers	 reconciling	 the	 organic	 Caribbean	integration	 at	 the	 cultural	 level	 with	 the	 formal	 structures	 of	policy-making.101	 This	 sits	 uncomfortably	with	 the	 reality	 of	 the	Cultural	 Protocol	 based	 on	 the	 UNESCO	 Convention,	 which	recognises	that			 while	the	convention	is	a	legal	instrument	that	is	binding	it	does	not	generate	 commitments	 to	 signatories	as	obtained	under	 the	WTO.	In	this	sense	the	convention	may	encourage	more	diversity	in	production	but	is	does	not	guarantee	space	in	the	market.102			Furthermore,	 continued	 restrictions	 on	 services	 mode	 4,103	movement	 of	 peoples,	 practically	 hinders	 the	 transition	 of	 this	Protocol	from	mere	rhetoric	to	reality.		Here	we	 are	dealing	with	different	phenomena,	which	do	not	necessarily	 converge:	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 Cultural	 Protocol	provides	 for	 trade	 in	 cultural	 services,	 but	 on	 the	 other,	 the	benefits	 seem	 neither	 particularly	 profitable,	 nor	 tangible.104	Indeed,	 there	 is	 much	 scepticism	 and	 critique	 of	 social	progression	 from	above.	This	 is	not	 just	 limited	to	 the	Caribbean	side	of	the	debate.	To	quote	Bourdieu:			
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 If	 I	 say	 that	 politicians,	 who	 sign	 international	 agreements	consigning	cultural	works	to	the	common	fate	of	interchangeable	commodities	 subject	 to	 the	 same	 laws	 that	 apply	 to	 corn,	bananas,	 or	 citrus	 fruit,	 are	 contributing	 (without	 always	knowing	it)	to	the	abasement	of	culture	and	minds,	it	will	be	said	that	I	am	exaggerating.105			This	 has	 much	 to	 do	 with	 the	 ‘social	 consequences	 of	‘commodification’,	 [that	 is	 the]	 inclusion	 in	 the	market	 sphere	of	relations	previously	left	outside	its	boundaries’.106	That	is,	despite	being	a	sensitive	issue	for	the	EU,	the	novel	inclusion	of	culture	in	this	 international	 trade	 agreement	 nevertheless	 does	 not	 tip	 the	balance	of	power.	At	the	time	it	appears	Pareto-optimal,	but	with	reflection	and	little	use,	it	seems	rather	superfluous	unless	there	is	any	tangible	usage.			The	case	of	the	Octroi	de	Mer	
	The	recent	extension	of	the	Octroi	de	Mer	(‘Dock	Duties’	which	are	imposed	on	all	 items	entering	the	French	Overseas	Departments,	even	 from	 within	 the	 European	 free	 market	 of	 which	 they	 are	ostensibly	a	part)	from	2015	to	2020,	up	to	the	very	same	date	as	the	 expiry	 of	 the	 Cotonou	 agreement,	 underscores	 the	 selective	use	of	such	concepts	of	PCD.		In	 fact,	 the	 extension	of	 the	Octroi	 de	Mer	 is	 in	 direct	 conflict	with	 the	 purported	 regional	 integration	 aims	 of	 the	 CF-EU	 EPA.	Furthermore,	 it	 is	 rather	 ironic	 that	 this	 was	 a	 key	 issue	 raised	amongst	 the	 CARIFORUM	 Consultative	 Committee	 during	 their	first	meeting	at	the	European	Economic	and	Social	Committee,107	yet	 by	 the	 following	 month	 this	 legislation	 was	 renewed	 in	 the	European	Parliament.		The	 case	 of	 how	 this	 renewal	 went	 through	 emergency	procedure	 in	 the	 European	 Parliament	 to	 be	 extended	 for	 a	further	 five	 years	 is	 emblematic	 of	many	unfortunate	 disparities	and	 incoherencies	 in	 EU-ACP	 relations.	 At	 once,	 it	 points	 to	 the	lack	 of	 awareness	 and	 engagement	 of	 Caribbean	 civil	 society	 in	European	 institutional	 processes.	 This	 also	 acts	 as	 a	 stark	reminder	of	the	importance	of	bolstering	words	and	rhetoric	with	concrete	 and	 concerted	 action.	 After	 all,	 had	 10	 per	 cent	 of	 the	members	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 Regional	 Committee	 been	fully	 aware	 of	 the	 dynamics	 and	 the	 detrimental	 implications	 of	the	 extension	 of	 the	 Octroi	 de	 Mer,	 the	 extension	 could	 have	delayed,	 perhaps	 even	 stopped.	 Indeed,	 post-extension	 the	
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 European	 counterparts,	 including	 MEPs	 who	 would	 have	 been	interested	 to	 act	 on	 this	 front	 were	 unaware	 of	 both	 the	contention	 and	 the	 passing	 of	 the	 extension	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	this	 is	a	competence	of	the	 ‘Regional	Development’	Committee	 in	the	European	Parliament.	In	other	words,	while	it	is	an	issue	that	is	very	important	for	ACP	stakeholders,	as	the	region’s	concerned	are	 still	 EU	 territories,	 this	 act	 was	 passed	 in	 the	 Regional	Committee	 of	 the	 Parliament	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 ACP-EU	 Joint	Parliamentary	 Assembly,	 in	what	 retrospectively	 seems	 a	 rather	
huis	clos	manner.		It	 has	 been	 long	 noted	 that	 the	 Octroi	 de	 Mer	 creates	 trade	distortions	 in	 the	 Caribbean,	 unfair	 competitive	 advantages,	 as	well	 as	 contradicting	 not	merely	 the	 logic	 of	 free	 trade	 but	 also	sustainable	 development.108	 A	 recent	 publication	 highlights	 the	legal	 inconsistencies	 between	 the	 Octroi	 de	 Mer	 and	 the	 CF-EU	EPA,	and,	importantly,	how	the	combined	result	is	incoherent	with	regard	 to	 promoting	 regional	 integration.109	 Indeed,	 the	 same	justifications	used	for	maintaining	the	Octroi	de	Mer	for	the	French	overseas	 territories,	 such	 as	 reference	 to	 their	 small	 size	 and	vulnerability	 to	 external	 shocks,	 can	 be	 applied	 equally	 to	 the	Small	Island	Developing	States	(SIDS).110		Consequently,	 this	 episode	not	 only	 undermines	Article	 12	 of	the	Cotonou	 agreement,	which	 states	 that	 the	EU	 should	 consult	with	 the	 ACP	 on	 issues	 of	 pertinence,	 but	 also	 the	 very	 raison	
d’être	 of	 the	 EPA,	 to	 promote	 further	 regional	 integration	 in	 the	Caribbean.	 It	 also	 therefore	 runs	 inherently	 counter	 to	 the	broader	 principle	 of	 policy	 coherence	 for	 development.	 Seven	years	into	the	provisional	application	of	the	EPA,	all	stakeholders	should	have	been	ready	 to	act	on	 this	 issue,	as	 important	as	 it	 is	for	 the	 region.	 Failure	 to	 do	 so	 merely	 reinforces	 the	 lack	 of	synergies	from	an	agreement	that	lacks	optimality.	The	upcoming	review	in	2017	does	however	offer	ACP	states	in	general,	and	SIDS	in	particular,	a	critical	opportunity	to	respond.			
CONCLUSION		In	 the	 recent	 ACP-EU	 Joint	 Parliamentary	 Assembly	 in	 the	European	 Parliament,	 one	 MEP	 provocatively	 compared	 ASEAN	with	 the	 ACP:	 while	 the	 former	 lost	 contact	 with	 their	 ex-European	 colonisers,	 the	 latter	 did	 not;	 equally,	 while	 ASEAN	developed	 to	 become	 one	 of	 the	 most	 dynamic	 regions	 in	 the	world	economy,	 the	ACP	did	not.	With	 five	years	until	 the	end	of	
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 the	 Cotonou	 agreement	 that	 binds	 the	 EU	 and	 ACP	 ostensibly	together,	 there	will	be	much	consulting	and	 reflection	 from	both	sides.		It	is	clear	that	the	ACP	as	a	homogenous	group	is	no	longer	of	strategic	 importance	 for	 the	EU.	The	ACP,	under	 the	vanguard	of	new	 leadership	 with	 Secretary	 General	 P.I.	 Gomes	 will	 have	 to	decide	 what	 relevance	 the	 body	 sees	 for	 itself	 in	 a	 globalised	world.	Time	will	tell	whether	the	EPA	story	may	be	emblematic	of	any	 future	 structural	 shifts:	 specifically	 whether	 it	 can	 correct	trade	imbalances	which	marginalize	developing	countries	in	their	aims	to	achieve	sustainable	development.		Thus	far,	the	EPA	story	is	more	emblematic	of	the	EU’s	interest	to	 pursue	 hegemonic	 relations	with	 the	 Small	 Island	Developing	States	(SIDS)	of	the	Caribbean,	and	to	emphasise	the	rhetoric	of	a	partnership	 of	 equals	 based	 in	 consent,	 rather	 than	 recourse	 to	coercion.	But	as	the	wider	EPA	saga	with	the	seven	ACP	regions	–	themselves	 a	 contrived	 creation	 at	 the	 EU’s	 behest	 –	 illustrates,	even	where	 the	 final	 agreement	may	 seem	 to	 represent	 consent,	the	reality	 is	one	characterized	by	 the	 inter-play	of	both	consent	and	 coercion.	 This	 in	 turn	 has	 soured	 EU-ACP	 relations	 on	 a	whole.	In	the	run	up	to	2020,	one	of	the	key	issue	is	whether,	as	a	result	of	EU	policy	pressure,	the	ACP	regions	split,	into	one	of	the	numerous	EPA	 conglomerations	possible,	 or	whether	by	 the	will	of	 development	 solidarity	 the	 ACP	 states	 will	 stay	 united	 in	 a	forged	consent	based	on	a	history	of	coercion.			
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